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Abstract 
According to the political phenomenology of law normative systems have multiple poles. From a politonomic 
point of view it is important for the number of communities which are poles of power to directly determine the 
forms and content of central power. In a one-pole system politocracy establishes, imposes and controls 
normative institutions for all communities (regional, local groups etc.); the advantage of this system is that it can 
settle disputes among those communities which pursue their activity autonomously as local power centres; the 
disadvantage of the system is that it limits normative autonomy of communities and it reduces their social power. 
As to the bipolar systems, in which there are two centres of normative power, each centre attempts to regulate 
the other one; the advantage of this system consists in the fact that each centre creates more and more efficient 
regulatory systems; the disadvantage is represented by the fact that a permanent confrontation between two 
forces uses up time, material and human resources. In tri-pole systems, each power system attempts to co-exist 
with at least one of the other two power poles or, anyway, it attempts not to conflict with the other two at the 
same time; the advantage consists in the fact that the normative system is the result of a legally institutionalized 
“compromise” between different principles and community values. Multi-pole systems have a set of rules of 
which the most important is the rule of not destroying the system the community belongs to. 
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Introduction 
 
The concept of politoarchea is used to define the phenomenon of power distribution by which 
(self) regulation is ensured so that each community acts autonomously; this leads to normative 
polycentrism and the polarity of the legislative system. 
Politoarchea defines the phenomenon of (self) regulation power distribution thanks to which 
each community can be normatively autonomous and determine the multiple poles of the legislative 
system. Political phenomenology of law reveals the fact that normative systems have multiple poles. 
From a politonomic point of view it is important to notice that the number of communities which are 
centres of normative power directly determines the form and content of central power. 
According to ideonomy, politoarchea is a system of norms and fundamental principles by 
means of which each community elaborates its own ideology as to the way in which its organization 
and functioning should be regulated. According to socionomy, politoarchea illustrates the 
multiplication and diversification of normative institutions for every community. From a politonomic 
point of view, normative, legal and non-legal autonomy is accomplished thanks to the right and 
capacity of any community to govern itself. As far as terminology is concerned, we have used the 
concept of community - within the field of phenomenology of law - for defining a group (structure) 
which has a particular profile thanks to its normative institutions. 
Political phenomenology of law illustrates the fact that the decline of legal centralism 
appeared as a consequence of administrative decentralization, which led to the multiplication of the 
legislative power centres. 
Politoarchea illustrates state evolution towards the efficient organization and functioning of 
local and regional powers in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity according to which public 
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responsibility must lie with the authorities that are close to citizens in accordance with their social 
tasks, the general interest and economic progress. Politoarchea defines a normative system which 
regulates social processes at different legislative levels in order to achieve public interest objectives; 
in Austria a formal system was set up for implementing public policies by administration structures; 
in Sweden the budgetary planning process is correlated to administrative structures objectives; in 
Germany the result-oriented management system is supported at land level; in Switzerland 
performance standards are established for public authorities. 
 
(a) Normative policentrism 
 
In monopolar systems politocracy sets up, imposes and controls legal institutions in all 
communities; the advantage of this system is that it can settle disputes incurred beween communities 
which are local centres of power; the disadvantage of the system is that it limits normative autonomy 
of communities and that it reduces social power. In bipolar systems, there are two centres of power 
and each of them tries to normatively subordinate the other one; the advantage of this systems is that 
each centre of power creates more and more efficient regulation systems in order to impose itself; the 
disadvantage is represented by the fact that a permanent conflict incurred between two forces uses up 
time, resources and effort. In tripolar systems each power centre tries to coexist with at leat one of the 
three poles or, anyway, it attempts to avoid conflict with the other two power centres at the same 
time; the advantage is represented by the fact that the normative systems are the result of a legally 
institutionalized compromise between different principles and values shared by the community. 
Multipolar systems have a set of rules, among which the most important one is represented by the 
interdiction to destroy the legal system thanks to which that community exists. From an ideonomical 
point of view, politoarchea is a system of principles according to which each social structure can 
develop its own ideology regarding the regulation of its organization and funtioning. According to 
socionomy, politoarchea represents the multiplication and diversification of normative institutions 
within any community. Politonomically, normative autonomy (legal or non-legal) is manifested as 
the right and capacity of any community to govern itself. As far as terminology is concerned, we 
have preferred to use the concept of community because we intend to bring into evidence the fact that 
a group (social structure) is defined by its normative institutions, too. Politoarchea may be better 
illustrated by using the concept of community, firstly because it illustrates a certain mentality as to 
(self)normativity, and secondly because it expresses solidarity as (self) regulation and thirdly because 
it describes (self) govenment forms more precisely. Normally, a community is self regulated by its 
institutions (religious, cultural, spiritual etc.) which, as normative systems, are different from legal 
institutions. The first conclusion we can draw is that normative plurality is based upon the 
community norms and principles (not upon territoriality); as the phenomenology of law illustrates 
some communities are normatively structured according to the same professional, ethnic or sexual 
relations although they are dispersed from a territorial point of view and, thus, cannot be regulated 
only according to territorial criteria. 
   If we deal with normative plurality from the perspective of each community’s regulations, 
we have to take into consideration the other side of the coin, too, i.e. the capacity of norms to modify 
a community’s preferences. In other words, the normative force derives both from each 
communitys’s force to elaborate its own norms and from its capacity to apply them in conformity (or 
not in conformity) with a centralized legal system. If all communities adhered to the principles of 
justice (seen as social justice), the centralized legal regulation of social relations would no longer be 
necessary. From a socionomic point of view, one can easily notice that the system of norms 
elaborated in the interest of a community does not identify with the normative centralized system 
which is meant to satisfy ”national interest”. The main problem regarding regulation autonomy 
focuses on the contradiction between the institution of normative ”centralization” and 
”decentralization”. If we consider that any centralized political system is socionomically dominating 1646  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
and politonomically opressive, then we can conclude that the system is obliged to ideonomically 
justify these prerogatives. Political phenomenology of law illustrates the fact that the state uses the 
legal system in order to oblige communities to observe certain norms such as the norms regarding 
individual rights and liberties; moreover, the legal system guarantees the fact that no community ever 
breaks the universal principles of law, among which one has to mention the defence of individual 
rights. On the other hand, normative centralism would limit the tendency of communities to become 
tyrannical and to restrain individual rights and liberties. One should mention here ”lenient 
communitarism” according to which state confinement policy should be replaced with policies that 
encourage community norms which can ensure the emergence of plural normativity. To solve this 
socionomic dichotomy governmental policies include, among others, institutions and resources by 
which certain social groups can be reintegrated in a centralized normative system. 
Phenomenologically, normative multipolarity appears as a multiplication of regulatory institutions 
(systems) which, paradoxically, regulate the same types of social relations differently, depending on 
the type of each local community. It is useful to refer to the programme of gentrification (Engl. 
gentry = person with a high statute), characterized by: the recolonization of old city centres with 
residents who have a high social statute; rehabilitation of the built areas and the introduction of new 
local services; bringing persons who have the same culture, customs, language or traditions in spaces 
which are especially designed for this purpose; economically reordering property values. 
Ideonomically, another form of pluralism may be illustrated by the multiplication of virtual 
communities which, even if they exclude direct (face to face) relations, they are ”real” communities 
as regards their capacity to form, regulate and support a certain community type. Such virtual 
communities do not rely only on technical computer-based communication means (CMC), but also 
on a set of common norms and values which set forth specific behaviour norms. Thus, Facebook 
does not only facilitate communication between individuals, but also coordinates social and political 
movements; at least in the sphere of ideonomy the set of norms used and officially accepted does not 
agree with the problem of dispersing ”ideal” power centres within a society. We consider that the 
spread of Internet isolates the individual from the community since more and more often and more 
and more deeply people get lost in cyberspace or better said become alienated. Lastly, a conflict 
arisen between virtual (online) community and the real (offline) community brings about the question 
of politically recognizing the rights of each community. Thus, we can use as a work hypothesis the 
fact that an ideonomic community can ensure socionomic politoarchea thanks to the fact that 
conceptual identity determines individuals to conform to a regulation system. 
Phenomenology of law deals with normative plurality which it regards as an effect of each 
group’s (community’s) manifesting its own will, thus, trying to regulate its own (adequate) system of 
norms, principles and institutions. Ideonomically, self-regulation requires being aware of the existing 
normative, legal or non-legal norms, principles and values, which are valid for the entire community. 
Normativism without subjectivism (understood as an inherent will of any person) would be 
impossible; let us remember Abraham Lincoln’s statement according to which no man is sufficiently 
good to govern another man, without the latter’s consent. Although the fact of being aware of a norm 
is not a coercitive (phyisically speaking) process, as Dennis Wrong points out, awareness generates a 
certain tension; according to Freud, the fear to lose someone becomes a threat, so it is coercitive. 
Ideonomically speaking, being aware of one’s obligations is essential for a decentralized normative 
theory; each attempt to break a norm generates a risk. The problem of legal deconcentration has been 
ideonomically dealt with avant la lettre by Max Weber who considered that - for the members of the 
legal profession - norms have value only if they reflect the idea of justice; this approach is different 
from the sociologists’ perspective, according to which norms have social value only if they can be 
used. Ideonomically, the existence of a decentralized normative system relies on the idea that 
individuals can become aware of their obligations and thus the observance of norms is simpler and 
quicker for them in comparison with the situation in which norms would be imposed on them from 
the outside. According to Kohlberg’s theory, there are three levels which mark the evolution of any Anton Parlagi 1647 
person’s moral judgement; on the first level, the ”pre-conventional” one, individuals observe laws for 
fear of a penalty or because they have a certain interest to do so; on the second level, the 
”conventional” level, individuals observe the law because they understand that moral principles 
represent a necessity; on the third level, the level of ”abstractization”, individuals observe legal 
norms, contractual obligations and justice considering that they are rational forms of existential 
regulation. Normative polarity is socionomically revealed by the distribution of the regulation 
capacity among more social power centres; however, ideonomically the situations is different for it is 
the individual’s consciousness that adopts, rejects or is neutral to the social norm. A. Lipietz adopts 
the same perspective. He states that progress by itself must not be obtained by any means unless it 
ensures the progress of the individual and collective options; from this point of view, he suggests a 
form of solidarity which can be accomplished by granting subsidies to ”self-organized” or social 
utility actitivities. Thus, ideonomically, normative pluralism requires the existence of institutions that 
allow regulation centres and autonomous institutions to interfere; this is particularly important for it 
ensures solidarity and community development. If we agree with the premise that any comunity has 
its normative system and that this system constitutes the ”law” of the community, we can draw the 
conclusion that politoarchea illustrates the lawfulness of law’s self-regulation. Ideonomically, 
politoarchea is the cognitive dimension of a community and it represents its vision regarding the 
system of norms which ensures its existence; in this context, community norms are landmarks for the 
evolution of the legal system, for the modification, regrouping or the replacement of certain law 
principles. From a socionomic perspective, the dimension and importance of individual, group or 
collective interests imposes a path dependence upon the values and principles of the legal system. 
According to politoarchea, a system of norms, once settled, distributes normative power among 
different regulation centres according to community norms, values or principles, which are more or 
less socialized. 
The dissemination of the regulation power among communities illustrates the fact that 
normative policentrism is indisolubilely linked to trans-community relations. Starting with the 
Middle Ages corporatism has proved to be a phenomenon which distributes socio-economic power 
among corporations and crafts organizations that were meant to regulate and control industrial and 
commercial activities and which, besides the clergy and the noblemen, formed the third socially 
important category in the state. The corporatist phenomenon is much older; thus, we can mention 
Titus Livius who used the phrase corpus civitatis to designate the community and Sallustius who 
used the phrase corpus fabrorum to designate the iron smiths craftmanship. According to the 
phenomenology of law, corporative normativity is important for us from two points of view: from a 
sociocratic perspective, since it reveals that these two non-state organizations have the authority to 
impose generally-compulsory norms for all its members and from a politocratic perspective, since 
these corporations function as normative institutions which represent an interface between the state 
and its citizens. Although the industrial revolution surpassed this form of social organization, the idea 
of corporatism was embraced by E. Durkheim in sociology and it was depicted as a useful institution 
for the moral training of the population, for the regulation of social discipline and for reducing 
anomia that modern society is suffering of. From a socionomic perspective, E. Durkheim understood 
that the state cannot surmont anomia, first of all because it does not establish a direct link with 
citizens and secondly because it has a neutral position as far as the civil society is concerned. 
Corporatist ideology was subsequently embraced by political interwar fascist institutions, which had 
an ethnically strong connotation. Franco’s plan to build a corporatist Spanish society was the most 
sustainable and probably the most authentic plan, though in Italy under Mussolini there existed a 
series of corporatist institutions. In Spain and Italy, national assemblies and state councils were 
organized in a similar way with corporations and less as constituencies or in accordance with the 
changeable electoral system. According to the fascist ideonomy, corporatist ideonomy was good for 
it avoided class disputes during democratic elections. Politoarchea affects relations between 
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interests, strategies and ideologies specific for different social organizations. Politocracy may impede 
access of other social structures to the decision-making process for saving its values and interests and 
this might lead to a normative blockage or to a legislative lack of decision. In this context, some 
European states accept the neocorporatist process of law-making according to which normative 
decision is the product of an institutinoalized dialogue between politocracy and the sectorial 
sociocracy. In this context we mention European integration as a phenomenon which implies 
decentralization and economic liberalization processes and which offered sociocracy ideonomic 
arguments for contesting the supremacy of the state in the law-making process. According to the 
political phenomenology of law, politoarchea determines the clash between the law-making political 
system and decentralized law-making systems; the unification, coordination and integration of 
normative systems do not depend upon the state but upon non-governmental decentralized networks. 
”State-sectorial corporatism”, normative pluricentrism tend to be replaced with negotiated normative 
centralism, which is more efficient because it allows the creation and implementation of public 
policies that are accepted both by the state and the local or sectorial communities. Normative 
pluralism functions thanks to neo-corporative institutions which currently indicate that politocracy is 
more and more inclined to closely cooperate with sociocracy (corporations, trade unions, employers 
associations, etc.) in the legislative domain with a view to more efficiently accomplish its functions 
of coordination and political control over society. Policentrism ensures a form of state organization in 
which there is a limited number of power centres which are ranked and differentiated per technical, 
scientific, economic etc. sectors of activity. What is important from a politonomic perspective is the 
fact that these corporations are regulated by the state and the legal statute they acquire ensures their 
reprezentation monopol in the sector in which they are active; on the other hand, these corporations 
are subject to the control of the state, as well as to the legal forms of access to political leadership. 
From a politonomical point of view, neo-corporatism proposes that public power distribution, as a 
multiparty governing system, should be accomplished by state representatives and social partners, as 
well: trade unions, employers associations, professional associations, farmers. Neo-corporatism is an 
institutionalized political compromise accomplished through legal norms according to which social 
organizations accept the status-quo (by which trade unions give up salary expectations) and the 
government representatives offer guarantees for a certain level of social welfare (by means of social 
security). The beneficial effect of this compromise consists in the participation of corporations to the 
legislative process, as well as to a more facile implementation of social norms. Moreover, we can talk 
about legal policentrism as an effect of the normative system multiplication determined by the 
requirements imposed by corporations or public utility foundations through the legal norms that 
regulated the organization and functioning thereof. Politocracy allows the setting up of corporations 
because these institutions can regulate and offer public services in sectors in which the state does not 
provide them: the physicians’ association, the architects’ order, bars associations, public notaries 
associations, experts associations, evaluators associations, farmers associations etc. Obviously, neo-
corporatism as a state phenomenon generates legal modifications; see the mixt legal regime of 
corporations, which are subject to public law and civil law. In these cases, the polinormative system 
is favourable because it leads to the specialization of management; the legal regulation is 
accomplished by specialists, by persons who have the same specialization as the people who manage 
the system; physicians for medical services; professors and teachers for educational services; artists 
for the field of art, etc. 
Normative pluralism – according to the sociocratic theory – states that certain social 
(structures) groups are entitled to set up normative institutions within a public area. The plural 
character of self regulation systems – which are specific for local communities – has been borrowed 
from the socialist theory of self-management, according to which society must be politically 
organized as a system of political centres (commune / town / region councils) economic centres 
(cooperative societies, mutual societies, worker councils). The possibility of setting up multiple 
normative systems within the state is supported by the postliberal democratic doctrine which states Anton Parlagi 1649 
that it is necessary to introduce ”economic responsibility”; the new structures of socio-economic 
power could be considered as institutions which are accountable to the community even though they 
are not subject to official legal norms. According to H. Gintis, a democratic control of the economic 
power structures would allow the collectivization (as a marxist concept) of property and the use of 
property for promoting individual rights. From an ideonomic point of view, we should reverse the 
relation between the individual and the economic organization of society in order to create a 
normative system in which work no longer remains a goal in itself but rather an evolution (a 
progress) of the individual within a democratic state. These sociocratic arguments form the basis of 
the theories regarding regulatory autonomy of local communities and the self-governing concept. 
Phenomenology of law states that local self- government cannot be assimilated with the notion of 
autonomy since it mirrors the executive dimension of normativity, i.e. the obligation to apply state 
legislation. A real autonomy of local authotities, which would give free leeway to normative 
pluralism, is possible only if ”executive responsibility” was transfered from these authorities towards 
social structures, as G. Boismenu, P. Hamel and G. Labica have pointed out. Sociocratic polarity also 
implies the problem of determining the subject of normative institutionalization, which may be a 
community (local, regional, national etc.) or an authority of public administration. One of the 
suggested solutions is to transfer normative power from public authorities to citizens or, more 
precisely, to certain citizen structures (committies). The so-called ”re-invention of governing” has as 
a starting point the possibility to distribute regulatory power and social control within community 
structures. Decentralization is more efficient than the centralization of legislative power because it 
allows communities to adopt autonomous decision and because it ensures the setting up of 
communities. Adopting such a normative structural model leads, according to M. Massenet, to the 
creation of a system of mutual and continuous dependence which would represent an alternative to 
the pyramid-like bureaucracy which is specific for the state. Sociocratic normative polarity manifests 
as an institutionalization of the relations between the existing different power centres: sociocratic 
supporters (who want to increase their profit), politocracy supporters (who want to maximize their 
decision-making power) and bureaucratic representatives (who want to augment their influence). 
Within a competitive system, distribution of regulatory power between institutions depends on the 
political force of each of them: according to this axiom the state is obliged to modify legislation in 
order to be able to counterbalance the normative efficiency of private institutions. The state which 
cannot (self) regulate its institutions is surpassed by private institutions: corporations, interest groups, 
non-governmental agencies. From this point of view, the phenomenon of ”agency transformation” is 
in its turn conclusive for legislative policentrism; the state ”transfers” regulation and control power 
towards private agencies, which it supports financially, totally or partially, by means of state 
subsidies. On the other hand, one cannot leave aside tehnical and scientific deconcentration thanks to 
which special institutions (moral persons of public law) have become autonomous - as far as their 
regulation is concerned - in relation to the state and territorial colectivities. Sociocratic normative 
policentrism must be analysed as a form of ”socialization” of normative power because it expresses 
freedom to adopt decisions from an ideonomic perspective thanks to the capacity to self manage 
socionomically and to the right to self-government. 
First of all, politoarchea seems limited by legal centralism which is justified most of the times 
by the obligation of the state to ensure ”general interest” as opposed to normative decentralization 
that gives free leeway to group or individual interests. Ideonomically, the theory of normative 
centralism is difficult to support with arguments simply because ”general interest” is an ideal goal 
and it can be accomplished both in a centralized and decentralized system at a community level. The 
ideal of normative centralization is to centralize a community ideal so that no normativity is 
necessary. Socionomically, it is however proved that a right is ensured in a ”centralized” way to the 
extent to which the political system guarantees it as a ”decentralized” right, which means that the 
right is guaranteed at local level, even if by means of the confining force of the state. The state 
guarantees individual freedom as any other right of general interest; however, this ”general interest” 1650  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
can be accomplished in a centralized way as well as in a decentralized way (under certain 
conditions). J. Chevallier sustains that general interest theory is used as an ideological weapon to 
harmonize the adherence of public administration to the state policy. Thus, legal centralism is 
ideonomically justified by general interest which stems out of the Christian ideal of the ”common 
welfare” and out of the ”general will” principle. Legal centralism comes to an ideonomic deadlock 
when it tries to legitimate, by means of the general interest, both normative power (the right to 
regulate) and normative autonomy (the right to self- regulate). Political phenomenology of law states 
that general interest paradoxically represents an ideonomic contradiction: on the one hand, it justifies 
obediance to political power (the only legitimate power which is entitled to define a collective 
interest) and, on the other hand, it represents the basis for political freedom (the only force which is 
entitled to limit power). From a politonomic point of view, we can notice that only authorities which 
are invested with public power are entitled to consider that an activity represents a public service; 
moreover, not any activity of public interest is a public service; consequently, we must accept the 
idea that public service expresses the will of the state, which illustrates the political nature of law. 
Politoarchea is meant to prove that political power attempts to establish what rights and liberties 
concur to the accomplishment of public interest and it also attempts to legally enforce them. The idea 
that general interest is a political basis for normative institutions comes to support the theory 
developed by politoarchea because normative institutions are in extremis normative ”services” 
meant to serve general interest. Thus, the normative service constitutes a legal version of the general 
interest concept; justice, administration, national defence, etc. are institutionalized forms of 
normative services that are subject to general interest. Socionomically, one can regard ”general 
interest” as a premise for the decentraliztion of normative power so that the state can implement its 
policy regarding individual rights and liberties in a centralized way at all levels. Politoarchea is not 
concerned with normative centralization or decentralization, but with the fair or unfair effects of 
normative power; from this point of view, the right of central authorities to take fair measures is 
preferable to the right of decentralized authorities to take unfair (discriminatory) measures and vice 
versa. Normative power cannot justify any discrimination though in administrative law certain 
discriminations are accepted under certain circumstances and under the obligation to observe the 
principles of eequality and proportionality. Decentralization of normative services has permanently 
faced with ideonomic centralism: as the state decentralized regulatory power within the community 
sphere, it had to justify its normative power. That is why the normative system is still centralized in 
areas like education, communications and information services with a view to supporting ideocracy. 
From a socionomic perspective, decentralization is necessary because an absolute decentralization is 
not possible from a social point of view, which does not mean that centralization cannot be 
maintained by deconcentrated institutions. The setting up of such institutions (the prefect is the 
typical example) has a double purpose: on the one hand, to maintain the normative power of the state 
through the exercise of legality control over local authorities acts and, on the other hand, to maintain 
state cohesion by coordinating contradictions between centralized power (territorial state 
administration) and local power (local administration autonomous authorities). From a politonomic 
perspective, the correspondence between legal decentralization and normative deconcentration is 
determined by the fact that administrative units have the same territorial limits as local collectivities. 
The more numerous deconcentrated jurisdiction prerogatives of state institutions, the bigger in 
number normative attributions of local powers. Thus, politoarchea refers to the transfer of normative 
power from the state to the deconcentrated institution level; deconcentrated structures have an ever 
increasing regulatory competence on socionomic level in comparison with central authorities which 
are confined to the ideonomic (concept, design, evaluation, etc.) perspective. 
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 (b) Territorial policentrism 
 
From a territorial point of view, normative pluricentrism implies the distribution of the 
regulatory power by the local (regional) collectivities which from an ideonomical point of view 
makes regulation to be mistaken for local autonomy. At territorial level, normative pluralism is 
relevant for the phenomenology of law because it mirrors the divide et impera (i.e. organize in order 
to govern) governing principle; this principle illustrates the territorial delimitation of a state out of 
political reasons; we should not forget that the root of the word ”territory” - jus terrendi refers to the 
right to frighten (to terify). With its modern connotation, the term ”territory” is an ideonomic 
representation of political frontiers and it started to be largely used after the French Revolution in 
1789 as a political and legal system for the administrative coordination of the nation-state; e. g. in the 
French doctrine territorial units were considered as internal spaces of the national territory. 
Phenomenology of law illustrates the fact that territorial organization is just an application of the 
Roman political principle (not the application of a legal principle) because its role is basically a 
politocratic one. Normative multipolarity proves that the organization of the state does not depend on 
criteria like: ”population” or ”territory” but on political criteria. If parts of the territory were 
”sovereign”, they would become states, a fact which would anihilate political power at central level 
(politocracy) and politocracy has always perceived itself as the sole sovereign authority. At territorial 
level the polarization of the legal regulatory power is mirrored by the normative regionalization 
phenomenon according to the principle of organizing the state into territorial administrative units 
which are smaller than the state and bigger than local collectivities. The policy of regionalism has 
evolved in several stages and it was determined by the development of national states within 
multinational empires such as the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire. Regional 
organizations were interested in administrative, cultural and political autonomy for promoting the 
rights of certain nationalities. Starting with the 8th decade in the 20th century, regionalism has been 
more valued as a consequence of the European integration which leads to the creation of consociative 
democracies; at this point in our paper one should mention Denis de Rougemont, who noticed avant 
la lettre that regionalism  is an element of the new European construction because it pushes 
federalism towards regionalism. Regionalism related to the political polarization of normative 
systems is important for several reasons: firstly, because regulations mirror the unbalance existing 
between the different parts of the national territory; secondly, because normative systems allow 
differences to exist between different territories as regards the regulation of cultural and linguistic 
rights; thirdly, because local normative systems are opposed to the normative centralism of the state. 
Normative plurality implies the existence on large geographical areas of many regional decision-
making institutions, which comprise several territorial administrative units of the state. From a 
politonomical point of view, regionalism mirrors a certain territorial configuration of the state, which 
is easier to manage by means of local administrative structures. Consequently, from a politonomical 
point of view the essence of regionalism consists in applying a political principle regarding the 
administration of the territory on several local communities which are grouped in so-called 
”development regions”. We can notice that regions are in fact institutions which have their own self-
regulatory systems; from this perspective it would be relevant to mention the fact that at European 
level there are two forms of territorial division: normative regions, created by establishing borders 
according to legal and administrative criteria and analitical regions which function thrgough the 
association of geographical complementary areas or as homogenous regions (they are created 
through the aggregation of areas which have similar characteristics). 
Phenomenology of normative policentrism proves that those forces which vehemently require 
the modification of normative systems in accordance with the principle of regionalization were and 
still are local (”peripherical”) political parties because they represent the interests of ethnic and 
cultural communities. The analysis of party systems which pursue their activity in European states 
proves that the setting up of new normative institutions is the result of the opposition which exists 1652  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
between political trends which support decentralization and those which support normative 
decentralization. In unitary states, excessive concentration of political power has led to the 
emergence of conflicts between center  and periphery, which led to a revision of constitutional 
principles through the extension of territorial and administrative decentralization types. The clash 
between center and periphery makes the object of the confrontation between centralists, unitarists or 
nationalists on the one hand, and regionalists, autonomists or federalists, on the other hand. If we 
accept the hypothesis that the center is the state, then centralism means maintaining a unique 
regulatory system within peripheries, too, though local communities are different from each other 
from an ethnical, linguistic, cultural and religious point of view; that is why national parties support 
legal centralism in contrast to ethnic-regional parties which support decentralization. Legal 
policentrism socionomically mirrors the capacity of local communities to autonomously regulate 
themselves, while politonomically legal policentrism mirrors the right of local communities to set upt 
their own regulatory institutions. This type of legal policentrism socionomically illustrates an 
administrative decentralization which does not affect politocracy directly especially because it does 
not imply political power but the functioning of normative institutions; on the other hand, politocracy 
is rather interested in the way in which normative institutions accomplish their political mission than 
in the way in which politocracy is organized and it functions. Since local (regional) public authorities 
are led by political party representatives, decentralization may also imply a transfer of normative but 
not political power; although the right to make decisions is decentralized, paradoxically, the content 
of decision is centralized: no matter the legal form the decision act may have, that decision is going 
to illustrate the local political parties representatives’ will simply because party representatives are 
obliged to comply with the party policy. Consequently, the transfer of attributions (including the 
legal regulation law) from the cental to the local level cannot be regarded as political 
decentralization. Since this normative decentralization does not affect politocracy, the legal system is 
permissive for it recognizes the right of local sociocracy to set up organization and functioning norms 
for its own institutions. That is why politarchea as Robert Dahl defines it should not be assimilated 
with a multiplication of command centers or with the dispersion of power but rather with self 
regulatory systems in which public authorities are influenced by sociocracy and in which citizens can 
control their leaders. In this respect, The European Charter of Local Self-Government (Art. 3 section 
2) states that the autonomy right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies which are made up of 
members elected by free, secret, equal, direct and universal vote and which can use executive and 
deliberative bodies that are suborinated to them; moreover, autonomy implies the right to organize 
citizens assemblies, referendum or any other form of citizen direct participation. The election of 
public authorities is legally regulated by politocracy; furthermore, citizens’ direct participation is 
ideonomically a way of self-government. For politocracy it is difficult to accept a parallel, external or 
competing form of government which might have different results, as it is difficult to accept an 
enlargement of the democratic frame determined by the mitigation of government resources that 
might be used to defend the opposition or to accept a confinement of the democratic frame through 
the mitigation of the opposition resources. Consequently, from a socionomic perspective, territorial 
decentralization may be legally regulated through norms that reduce the volume of workload from 
the ”center” and allow the functioning of more ”peripheric” local power centres. From a politonomic 
point of view, territorial decentralization may be legally regulated though it cannot be politically 
justified as long as sovereignty implies the unique character of power (rather than its multiplication). 
In conclusion, we can say that legislative policentrism mirrors a normative autonomy which is 
politically regulated while the very power of autonomy is legally supported. 
Phenomenology of law brings into evidence the fact that normative polarity has at territorial 
level a politonomic character since normative policies are elaborated and implemented in the territory 
in accordance with political will. We should not forget that the notion of ”territoriality” became 
important during the French Revolution thanks to Paul Allies who used it to directly refer to the 
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organization was added. From an ideonomic perspective, territoriality is only a compromise between 
the elective principle and the bureaucratic principle, according to which political authority functions 
only through the agency of administration; this is the reason why ideocracy attempts to argument 
territorial delimitation by non-political institutions and consequently legitimate state authorities at 
local level. From a socionomic perspective, territorialization means dividing the state according to 
politocratic criteria and transfering public authority to local elites, i.e. sociocracy; thus, a 
”peripherical” power is created and it is exercised by local representatives and public officials etc. 
who must accomplish the general (state) will at territorial level. Territorial political polarization is 
accomplished through deconcentration governmental policies at local level; political polarity of 
normative systems is accomplished socionomically through self-governing institutions which are 
specific for any local collectivity; finally, political polarity is ideonomically justified through the 
theory of the local welfare which prevails over general interest. This multicentrism is considered by 
P. Gremion as a manifestation of ”peripherical” power  since both high officials and local civil 
servants guarantee the accomplishment of general interest since they represent the state in its 
deconcentrated structures. From a politonomic point of view the notion of ”peripherical” power is 
improper because by definition power seen as a form of exercising social dominance is centralized. 
According to the phenomenology of law, J. C. Thoenig’s opinion regarding the fact that all local 
collectivities acquire the statute of legitimate spaces for integrating public policies is much more 
useful for understanding normative polarity; in fact, the way regulatory power (and not the territory) 
is used may be legitimate or illegitimate in a state. Thoenig refers to the French type of territorial 
state when he defines the new forms of collective power institutionalization at the level of of 
”communes” and ”departments” from a socionomic perspective. Normative polarization reveals at 
different territorial levels that legal institutions and regulation procedures of the ”local interest” are 
different and often come in contradiction with state institutions which promote ”general interest”. 
Political polarity of normative systems is determined by the content of regulation; e. g., in the Anglo-
Saxon doctrine, different terms are used to define territoriality of a public policy: local government, 
urban governance, policy networks or alliance for development. Consequently, at ideonomic level, 
institutions which are regarded both as a central and as a local normative authority come to be 
considered legitimate. The distribution of regulatory power among a central and a local authority led 
to paradoxical situations such as the coexistence of two different authorities in the same individual – 
this is the case of ”competition” generated by normative decentralization between different authority 
positions; moreover, this competition can be noticed with persons who occupy two public positions, 
one at central level and one at local level (see systems that allow a person to simultaneously occupy 
more public positions). According to the phenomenology of law, political polarity is important for it 
determines the subject of a regulation in a particular case – e.g., in some legal systems, such as the 
French one, a Member of Parliament can also be a mayor. In this respect, O. Duhamel comes with a 
socionomic solutions, i.e. to neglect the political dimension of normative acts since decentralization 
refers to the executive system not to the legislative system. Such an approach cannot be 
ideonomically supported for normative acts always illustrate a certain political ideology; moreover, 
the solution cannot be politonomically argued for normative acts generate effects only if they are 
guaranteed by a political and legal system. 
From a phenomenological perspective, politoarchea can be set up through the distribution of 
regulatory power in the elaboration of local policies by the state through the investment of local 
authorities with different powers. In fact, the phenomenon of politoarchea appeared in the European 
states once local development principles were created; let us not forget that public authorities were 
entitled and ogliged to facilitate relations between enterprises and local institutions in order to ensure 
the economic and social progress of the local collectivity. As the process of decentralization spread, 
forms of politoarchea improved so that regulatory power became ”specialized”: e.g. in France, 
regions have regulatory power in territorial planification, professional training, etc.; departments 
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communes exercise their regulatory power for commune urbanism, schools etc. In a negative sense, 
politoarchea illustrates that the implementation of ”central” legislation depends on a multitude of 
”local” application norms; e. g., let us take into consideration environmental legislation in which 
there are a large number of technical instructions which illustrate a certain political connotation to 
application norms. Normally, dispositions issued by local public administration authorities comprise 
interdiction norms, preliminary authorizations, fines which hinder the application of central 
legislation. In a positive way, politoarchea implies regulations which stimulate the implementation 
of central legislation and contracts whereby the state associates with local collectivities for 
accomplishing common interest projects. The normative capacity of politoarchea is illustrated by the 
augmented regulatory power of local collectivities which - beyond the normative frame established 
by the central power - have created specific ways of adopting decisions: within towns communities, 
regional councils, trans-border development committees, etc. The phenomenon is illustrated in the 
American economic doctrine which approaches local development through the perspective of 
”administrative” regions because both state and private institutions can benefit from these 
decentralized structures; all towns can be administrative regions and can ensure what is known as a 
relational economy. Politoarchea is also illustrated by a large number of econonomic structures 
which are autonomously organized at local level; moreover, from an ideonomic perspective, these 
decentralized structures are known as ”focal point regions” even if they are not recognized as legal 
persons from an administrative and territorial point of view. The concept of focal point region 
implies the idea that there are regions within other larger regions which have the same regulation 
form, e.g. commercial regulation. Phenomenology reveals the fact that politoarchea is also illustrated 
by ”public conventions” which are normally concluded at regional or local level between public 
administration authorities and private legal persons as public-private partnerships. From an 
ideonomic perpsective, the public-private partnership defines a rule which refers to the research, 
designing and creation of normative acts that could not be accomplished if the public and private 
sectors acted separately; as a socionomic institution, public-private partnership requires a set of rules 
as to the share each one is entitled to obtain from the resulted benefits and the responsibility each 
party has; politonomically, partnership is a form of settling social and economic disputes and of 
controlling normative policy making. What is of interest for the phenomenology of law is the fact 
that by public conventions several types of contractual relations – which are different from private 
and administrative contracts since they have a political rather than legal nature – become official. 
Phenomenology of law has recorded essential modifications at all territorial levels; 
ideonomically, one can notice a change in the mentality of local authorities, which is illustrated by 
the issuance of normative acts that are specific for a certain community and, thus, different from the 
acts that are applied for other communities; socionomically speaking, one can notice the modification 
of community regulatory systems according to the interests of local pressure groups; politonomically 
speaking, one can notice that regulation for the ”public interest” is a construct limited to a territory 
and a community, without any interference with the ”general (or national) interest”. If we take into 
consideration the politonomic criterion, territorialization actually indicates a deconcentration of the 
public power as a reply to legal state centralism; to politocracy the aim of territorial administrative 
delimitation is to facilitate the exercise of power and not to apply the descentralized principles. In 
reality, these plans interact so that the phenomenon of legal regulation appears either as a manner of 
justifying a normative policy at territorial level or as a necessity to solve territorial problems by an 
adequate normative policy. Phenomenology reveals that the limitation of the state normative power 
started when legislative autonomy of certain deconcentrated institutions was recognized; 
subsequently, this phenomenon extended to public authorities which are elected by the citizens; 
finally, the state ”tutelage” was reduced to its a posteriori control as regards the legal nature of 
normative acts. Paradoxically, to allow decentralization the state enlarges legal limits in order to 
defend individual freedoms by means of centralized institutions: hierarchical administrative (or 
tutelage) control; the control exercised through the initiative of the aggrieved person; the conciliation Anton Parlagi 1655 
procedure through the agency of the Ombudsman; civil administrative liability, etc. Legal 
policentrism has a series of supporters of public choice who consider that public institutions are set 
up, evolve and disappear under the influence of the exchanges between individuals. Taking this 
opinion as a starting point, another hypothesis was developed according to which the most important 
factors of normative deconcentration are not political decision factors, as E. Kiser stated, but rather 
the administration representantives (agents) and the administered persons who regulate 
administrative activity as a consequence of their interaction. The idea of coparticipating in the 
regulatory activity was borrowed from the public option theory by state representatives for improving 
regulatory services and also for adapting to budgetary limitations imposed by governments. 
Supporters of public authority autonomy and subsidiarity consider that the application of the ”public 
option” principle at the level of deconcentrated institutions is opposed to the traditional bureaucratic 
model by which civil servants were obliged to confine themselves to executing political decisions. 
The results of researching ”public options” have substantially contributed to the reform of regulatory 
systems: they have led to transformations in law enforcement besides social extranormative 
regulation, to free election management systems which stimulate state agents adopt innovations, 
conventions, collaborations, etc., to focusing controlling budgetary expenses on public utility 
services and to improving citizens-beneficiaries relations by introducing new communication and 
decision- making systems. Actually, the theory of public option does not contradict the fact that 
politocracy determines the nature and functions of the normative system; in this respect, normative 
policentrism illustrates content diversity and public policy application. Public option policy can be 
accomplished as an option for certain normative policies which can promote policentrism or on the 
contrary confine it. We can give a single illustrative example in this respect: the state still prefers to 
centralize social security policy and support expenses for offering unemployment payments though it 
could use the same sum for subsidizing enterprises which offer workplace to the unemployed. From a 
socionomic perspective, a decentralization of state obligations means an extension of normative 
policentrism by setting up non-state structures which can assume both social rights and duties. From 
a politonomic perspective, policentrism is supported by a ”modular policy”, a concept which was 
introduced by E. Gellner to define the flexible structure of political opportunities in forming 
(modifying) collective identities which are specific for modern societeis. Modular policy has first of 
all an ideonomic significance for it refers to multiple collective identities, mixes, interdependence 
and combinations thereof which influence political phenomena. Modularity – which is specific for 
territorial policies –socionomically determines legal policentrism because it imposes upon normative 
systems rules that are specific for ethnical, racial, sexual, professional and associative communities 
and that determine the so-called ”volatile colective identities”, according to Krieger’s terminology. 
  
(c) Institutional policentrism 
 
Multipolarity of normative services does not exclude the unique nature of regulating service 
standards; in this respect, we mention the right of government to exercise authority in maintaining 
uniformity (standards) services at national level, in domains such as: educational policy in France, 
the Austrian higher education system or the British social security system. Politoarchea illustrates 
the regulatory centres multiplication process which is determined by the political and legal 
decentralization process; the legal effect of this process is the legitimate possibility of each power 
centre to self regulate. Self-regulation politonomically represents a transfer of the state regulatory 
power towards institutions, basically local public authorities. Sociocracy (local political and 
administrative elites) will never give up the power that has been granted to them by the state; in this 
respect, the most important sector is the normative one. The state, in its turn, is interested in legal 
decentralization for avoiding political responsibility and transfering the task of social problem 
regulation to local level; multiplication of decision levels represents an insignificant cost in 
comparison with politocracy evasion. Thus, the welfare state yileds normative activity to local 1656  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
communities or, more precisely, to local sociocracy; consequently, territorial elites (represented by 
politically appointed persons or by persons elected by the citizens, as well as by a part of the high 
officials) become directly responsible for local problems. Politoarchea destroys state monopoly over 
social regulation and it makes society a democratic one because it distributes decision-making power 
to lower levels. Although Robert Dahl used the concept of ”poliarchea” only with a politonomic 
connotation, as a form of public authority control over government policies (except for ideonomy and 
socionomy), one has to appreciate his contribution to defining procedural democracy. A form of 
”structural”  politoarchea has started to be more and more used as a consequence of legislative 
authority decentralization from the state to regions and other territorial administrative units besides 
transfering legal responsibility from governmental to the local authorities level. Structural 
politoarchea is socionomically legitimized by the fact that decentralization allows (self)governing 
institutions to be more democratic, on the one hand, and more efficient, on the other hand, thanks to 
subsidiarity. It is known that within a legal bureaucratised system the activity is pursued in 
conformity with the norms established by the central power, which hinders the evolution of law 
firstly because political management is limited to controlling conformity of institutions and the 
system and, secondly, because it limits institutional innovation. According to politonomy, normative 
authority decentralization is necessary for the rule of law state to function, that is why many 
governmental policies have as a political objective the transfer of the regulation right towards local 
authorities; from a socionomic point of view, one can notice that community normativity is more 
efficient if it is accomplished through citizen institutions, simply because it expresses the others’ 
interests. Normative power decentralization does not anihilate the power of central authority but it 
distributes regulatory responsibility between different political decision-making levels. Politoarchea 
creates a systems of distributing legal responsibility between different public authorities, system in 
which a central authority is entitled to monitore the way in which local authorities ensure uniformity; 
obviously, citizens must be equally treated by the law and this requires a limitation of the regulatory 
power entrusted to local authorities. 
Politoarchea has become an ”institution” as a consequence of the fact that regulatory power 
was decentralized leading to the multiplication of normative public institutions and services. The 
distribution of normative power is a reaction to the tyrannical state which dominates civil society and 
imposes legal formalism. According to the phenomenology of law, politoarchea illustrates the fact 
that the regulatory keynesian model, i.e. centralized control of social institutions from top level 
management to the lowest hierarchical level, is still being debated. Politoarchea is the reaction to a 
political voluntarism which imposes a one-direction conception as to public policies and the way 
they are implemented in order to obtain the effects a wholly integrated system expects to obtain. 
Abandoning trust to the superiority of the state centrist system is the socionomic effect of legislative 
decentralization and institutional deconcentration. Paradoxically, the state intended to apply 
deconcentration because it is the quickest method for implementing political decisions and the most 
permissive form of political control. Once institutions are deconcentrated, the state has lost the right 
and capacity to regulate more specific domains. It is obvious that a legal decentralization is 
preferrable to an excessive legal system that rejects any community regulatory form or method; 
however, refuse to centralized legal control implies the risk of setting up anarchy for this refusal is 
opposed to the state and it leads to organizing ad-hoc regulatory forms. In order to conciliate state 
legally formalized institutions with normative autonomy, some authors, such as J. Donzelot, 
suggested (without using the term) an institutional politoarchea (formal meeting) which would 
ensure adhesion of social partners to a certain normative system. These decentralized ”institutions” 
are an alternative to state formalism and allow original societies, regions and even individuals to exist 
so that social and economic problems could be solved. Phenomenology of law reveals that 
institutional politoarchea was first of all created in the sphere of ideonomy; if the meaning of ”public 
regulation” phrase was initially correlated to collectivity, subsequently the phrase was interpreted as 
signifying regulation no matter what form regulation takes. Secondly, from a socionomic perspective, Anton Parlagi 1657 
politoarchea illustrates the multiplication of regulatory services distribution criteria; initially, a public 
regulatory institution was preferred because it implied free of charge services; however, 
subsequently, institutions that offer paid services were preferred (because they proved to be more 
efficient) even if they were set up as private persons. Finally, at politonomic level, normative 
decentralization created a politoarchea of corporations; public notary services, as well as legal 
assistance / mediation / consulting services are examples of regulatory power distribution from the 
state to corporative level. From a phenomenological point of view, one can notice a movement away 
from centralized normative power to multipolary regulation forms, i.e. towards the policentrism of 
regulatory communities. 
To the political phenomenology of law politoarchea is also very important; its forms are set 
up by formalized cooperation agreements concluded between different social structures in order to 
obtain common objectives, including in the domain of self-government. The idea of setting up a 
conventional politoarchea is present in Leopold Kohr’s theory; according to Kohr the ideal of state 
organization creates a conglomerate of organizations, towns or smaller regions because they are more 
efficient and more creative than a huge state. According to Kohr, bigger states must transform into 
smaller ones which need to organize themselves as a federal system, like Switzerland, which has 
more equal and autonomous cantons. In its turn, R. H. Tawney pleaded for the radical 
democratization of society by dispersing power with a view to becoming aware of the ”common 
welfare”; one of the ways in which power can be dispersed is regulating social and economic 
equality. Even if power must be concentrated, the process must be justified by ”general interest”. 
Tawney actually replaces the politonomic meaning of power with its ideonomic significance when he 
states that power is founded on the idea of ”welfare” because power, understood as authority, can 
enjoy more legitimacy and social recognition in consequence.  
Ideonomically, self-governing supports politoarchea because it ensures the autonomy of local 
collectivities; this significance is illustrated, e. g., in common law, through the concepts of local 
government or self-government. From a socionomic point of view, the principle of self-government 
implies the decentralization of administrative and financial competences from governamental level to 
the local public administration authorities level. The socionomic character of decentraliztion derives 
from the fact that public power which is exercised by local authorities is circumscribed by a political 
convention, i.e. delegated (or separated) competences. In other words, the degree of decentralization 
depends on the limits imposed by politocracy. These political limits define the content of 
decentralization, the territory / population size, the volume of resources and autonomous authorities. 
According to the phenomenology of law, the vulnerable point of conventional politoarchea is 
represented by the fact that any transfer of normative attributions towards local collectivities – in the 
context of maintaining the right of the state to pass laws – cannot generate political effects. 
Institutionalized  politoarchea is characterized by the fact that it centralizes power and it 
decentralizes its execution function; in this respect, legal centralism is the most eloquent example for 
the way in which public authorities, services and institutions implement centralized normative state 
policy in the territory. Legal centralism illustrates politocracy, the effort of government members to 
elaborate and implement normative policies by which certain legal principles or values could be 
justified. One has to recognize that legal centralism was avant la lettre defined by Thomas Hobbes 
when he stated that without a sovereign a society faces anarchy; we should not forget that in 
Hobbes’s society it was not possible to have a non-legal social control system; today we have this 
possibility thanks to the existing ways of imposing normative decentralization. Both social and legal 
norms constitute premises for social order, which means that institutional politoarchea must ensure 
the correlation thereof; first of all, because fair social norms mitigate the public authorities 
intervention for enforcing the law; secondly, laws which ensure social equity are more easily 
enforced; finally, because laws which satisfy social interests have more chances to be applied. 
Politoarchea, thus, requires the organization of decentralized institutions that would allow power 
concentration be maintained; even if an institution is set up in order to increase the efficiency of 1658  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
political power, this institution does not survive unless it confines itself to concentrating its power. 
As Alan Minc points out, social factors (especially psyhological and cultural factors) play a more 
important role in establishing precedents than in expressing subsequent appreciations that might 
influence the individual’s decisions (or the decisions of the social group) to avoid risks; economic 
factors are also important for the phenomenology of politoarchea because they direct the individuals’ 
decisions towards low risk investments. Legal centralism obviously implies normative policies to be 
adopted at central level; however, this does not cancel the right of individuals or social groups to 
make decisions autonomously; for example, environmental regulations entitle enterprisers to 
independently choose their own methods for reducing pollution. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Politoarchea is limited as far as deconcentration is concerned because regulatory power 
distribution is accomplished at local level by means of public institutions which are meant to 
implement a unique political power and maintain legal centralism and because they are invested with 
decision-making power in a domain which is strictly legal. Deconcentration as a way of organizing 
administration allows politocracy to maintain its right to adopt decisions at central level, including 
the right to adopt power-like prerogatives, to appoint or remove from office those in charge with the 
running of different institutions and deconcentrated services, to impose compulsory obligations on 
the institutions in the territory, to control or even to be subject to the activity pursued by these 
institutions etc. It is obvious that these institutions cannot be defined otherwise than politonomically 
since from a socionomical point of view it is difficult to justify the functionining of similar 
institutions while there are different legal regulations. Politoarchea grants a local institution the 
power to legally regulate at territorial level though politically this institution is subject to central 
power. Politoarchea implies institutional deconcentration since politonomically it illustrates the right 
of politocracy to set up its legal institutions.  
The most illustrative example is the right of central authorities to appoint political persons in 
managerial positions within public institutions; governments appoint representatives in the territory 
to coordinate the deconcentrated public services for central administration. This leadership concept 
has, from an ideonomic perspective, a political significance since the prefect, e.g., exercises his 
authority in the name and interest of accomplishing the government political programme. 
Politoarchea illustrates the political transfer of social (state) leading powers at the level of 
communities in conformity with the existing legal norms and procedures. Socionomically, a decision 
adopted by a public local authority generates legal effects on the whole collectivity though it is not 
issued by a sovereign authority but by a local public authority: land assembly, regional committee, 
county or local council, etc. Politonomically, the interpretation, amendment or application of law is a 
formal positive legal source thanks to the political character of local autonomy and not to the legal 
character of self-government. 
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